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DEBATE OVER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Ernest A. Young* 
Response to:  Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal 
Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2009). 
A.J. Bellia and Brad Clark have performed a valuable service for 
other scholars interested in foreign relations law and federal jurisdiction 
by collecting and illuminating—with their usual care and insight—the 
historical practice of both English and early American courts with 
respect to the law of nations.  Their recent Article, The Federal Common 
Law of Nations,1 demonstrates that, while American courts have not 
generally treated customary international law (CIL) as supreme federal 
law, they have applied such law where necessary to vindicate the “perfect 
rights” of foreign nations.  In so doing, American courts have protected 
the prerogatives of the political branches to “recognize foreign nations, 
conduct foreign relations, and decide momentous questions of war and 
peace.”2  Although Professors Bellia and Clark disavow any attempt “to 
settle all questions of how customary international law interacts with the 
federal system,”3 they do suggest that their approach represents a middle 
ground between proponents of the “modern position” that CIL simply is 
federal common law4 and critics of that position, who insist that CIL may 
be applied by American courts only where it is incorporated into the 
domestic legal system through an affirmative act by the political 
branches.5 
 
* Professor of Law, Duke Law School.  I am grateful to A.J. Bellia, Curt Bradley, and 
Brad Clark for helpful comments and to Emily Brown for valuable research assistance.   
1. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 
109 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2009). 
2. Id. at 1. 
3. Id. 
4. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 111 
reporters’ note 3 (1987) (noting that “the modern view, is that customary international 
law is federal law”); Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power 
of International Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 295, 295 (1994) (“International law is federal 
law.”). 
5. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
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This response makes three points.  First, I quibble with the historical 
account offered by Professors Bellia and Clark on two minor, yet at least 
somewhat significant, grounds:  The debate over reception of the 
common law at the federal Constitutional Convention shows greater 
early skepticism about judge-made common law than Bellia and Clark 
suggest; also, the jurisdictional provisions of Article III covering cases 
implicating foreign affairs were not intended fully to centralize power 
over such cases in federal courts because they left concurrent jurisdiction 
in the state courts.  Second, I question the extent to which the Founding 
Era history is directly relevant to contemporary debates about how to 
treat CIL.  Finally, I contend that what does the real work in the Bellia 
and Clark approach is simply constitutionally-grounded concerns about 
the separation of powers in foreign affairs cases, not anything about CIL 
per se.  Their position thus reduces to the largely uncontroversial claim 
that federal courts may make federal common law to protect these 
constitutionally-grounded federal interests, and they may sometimes 
draw the content of federal common law from international law. 
I.  JUDICIAL POWER IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
First, the history.  Professors Bellia and Clark argue that the 
founding generation entertained an “initial assumption that the United 
States—like the states—had received the common law and thus could 
prosecute and punish common law crimes, including offenses against 
the law of nations.”6  Bellia and Clark acknowledge that this assumption 
was widely rejected in the course of debates over the constitutionality of 
the Sedition Act.7  Indeed, when the Supreme Court definitively interred 
the doctrine of federal common law crimes in the 1812 case of United 
States v. Hudson & Goodwin, it could say that the question already had 
long been “settled in public opinion.”8  Nonetheless, they seem to think 
that the Framers’ “initial assumption” supports a judicial willingness to 
enforce the law of nations in other contexts that survived Hudson & 
Goodwin.9 
A related debate in the early Republic, however, suggests even 
greater hostility to the idea of federal common lawmaking powers.  As 
 
Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 817 (1997) 
(“CIL should not have the status of federal common law.”).  The middle ground 
suggested by Professors Bellia and Clark is distinct from—although not inconsistent 
with—the middle ground that I and others have staked out elsewhere.  See generally 
Arthur M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 Yale J. Int’l 
L. 1, 48–49 (1995) (arguing that CIL is analogous to “the law of a foreign country”); 
Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 Va. J. Int’l 
L. 365, 369–70 (2002) [hereinafter Young, Sorting] (arguing that CIL should be treated 
as “general” law and applied “in appropriate cases as determined by traditional principles 
of the conflict of laws”). 
6. Bellia & Clark, supra note 1, at 47–48.   
7. Id. at 54–55. 
8. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812). 
9. Bellia & Clark, supra note 1, at 59.   
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Justice Souter has pointed out, “the founding generation . . . join[ed] . . . 
an appreciation of its immediate and powerful common-law heritage 
with caution in settling that inheritance on the political systems of the 
new Republic.”10  The colonial and early state governments carefully 
limited their reception of English common law to those principles that 
were applicable to local conditions.11  Citizens of the young Republic 
often viewed the common law with considerable hostility; after all, they 
had just fought a revolution to throw off English rule.12 
This ambivalence played out in debates over ratification of the new 
national Constitution.  All participants seem to have understood that the 
new federal Constitution did not receive the English common law as part 
of national law,13 unlike many of the state constitutions. Opponents of 
ratification went so far as to complain that the proposed document failed 
to guarantee common law rights.14  Federalists responded that receiving 
the common law into the federal Constitution would trample the 
diversity of the common law, as received in the several states; even worse, 
a federal reception would render the common law “immutable” and not 
subject to congressional revision.15  Hence, “the Framers chose to 
recognize only particular common-law concepts, such as the writ of 
habeas corpus, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, and the distinction between 
law and equity, U.S. Const., Amdt. 7, by specific reference in the 
constitutional text.”16  They insisted, however, that any general reception 
of the English common law into federal law would be “destructive to 
republican principles.”17 
 
10. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 132 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
11. See id. at 132–37; see also Richard C. Dale, The Adoption of the Common Law by 
the American Colonies, 30 Am. L. Reg. 553, 554 (1882) (noting that common law has 
been “imported . . . as far as it was applicable”); Harry W. Jones, The Common Law in the 
United States:  English Themes and American Variations, in Political Separation and 
Legal Continuity 91, 98 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1976) (describing “selective nature” of use of 
common law in colonies). 
12. James Monroe, for example, urged that “the application of the principles of the 
English common law to our constitution” should be considered “good cause for 
impeachment.”  Letter from James Monroe to John Breckenridge (Jan. 15, 1802), in 3 
Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 59 (1919). 
13. See, e.g., Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), in 
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law:  Part Two, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1231, 1326 
app. A (1985) (stating “I do not believe one man can be found” who holds “that the 
common law of England has . . . been adopted as the common law of America by the 
Constitution of the United States”). 
14. See, e.g., George Mason, Objections to this Constitution of Government, 
reprinted in 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 637 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(complaining that, under Constitution as proposed, Americans would not be “secured 
even in the enjoyment of the benefit of the common law”). 
15. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 139–40 (Souter, J., dissenting) (collecting historical 
evidence); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law:  Part One, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1003, 1056 (1985) (noting states incorporated English common law in different 
manners). 
16. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 137–38 (Souter, J., dissenting).   
17. Edmund Randolph, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 15, 1788), in 3 
Elliot’s Debates on the Federal Convention 469–70 (1866); see also Letter from Madison 
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It is important to remember, of course, that the customary 
international law of the Founding Era was then, as now, a distinct body 
of law from the common law of England.  To the extent that Professors 
Bellia and Clark use early Federalist support for federal common law 
crimes as a more general indicator of receptivity to unwritten law like 
CIL, however, the even earlier—and more broad-based—caution about 
receiving the English common law pushes in the other direction.  More 
generally, the early American reaction to the common law in both the 
Federal Constitution and the states suggests a general suspicion of 
unwritten, judge-defined law and a strong preference for legislative 
primacy.  This is quite consistent, of course, with the Framers’ decision 
explicitly to authorize Congress to “define and punish . . . Offenses against 
the Law of Nations.”18 
My second historical quibble can be stated much more briefly.  
Professors Bellia and Clark, as well as a number of other participants in 
debates about federal foreign affairs powers, stress the Framers’ 
provision in Article III for several heads of jurisdiction bearing primarily 
on cases implicating foreign relations as evidence that the Framers 
intended for the national government to exercise exclusive control over 
external affairs.19  The relevant heads of jurisdiction include jurisdiction 
over cases affecting ambassadors, admiralty cases, and alienage cases.20  
The problem with inferring any broad principle of federal exclusivity 
from these provisions is that none of these heads of jurisdiction, even as 
implemented by Congress, excluded concurrent state court 
jurisdiction.21  Even the admiralty grant, which purported to be exclusive 
in the first Judiciary Act,22 was rendered effectively concurrent by the 
“Saving to Suitors” clause permitting state court litigation of cases falling 
within the maritime jurisdiction.23  Moreover, it is one thing to think that 
the Founders wanted to provide access to a federal forum in foreign 
relations cases, and quite another to conclude that the Founders wanted 
to federalize the applicable law. 
 
to Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), in 3 Records of the Federal Constitution, supra note 14, at 
130 app. A CXXXIV (complaining that common law contained “a thousand 
heterogeneous & antirepublican doctrines”). 
18. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
19. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 1, at 35–45; see also Beth Stephens, The Law of 
Our Land:  Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 
393, 404 (1997) (asserting that “the framers focused on the need to ensure federal control 
over enforcement of the law of nations”).  
20. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (conferring jurisdiction to federal courts).  
21. See generally Young, Sorting, supra note 5, at 423–32 (arguing Framers did not 
intend to create system of exclusive federal authority).   
22. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (1789) (providing that “the 
district courts . . . shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction”). 
23. See id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 77 (qualifying exclusive grant by “saving to suitors, in all 
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it”).  
See generally David W. Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism:  History and Analysis of 
Problems of Federal-State Relations in the Maritime Law of the United States 18–19 
(1970) (describing concurrent maritime jurisdiction).  
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If these jurisdictional grants “existed to uphold [national] political 
branch authority,”24 as Professors Bellia and Clark suggest, then the 
Framers were fairly tolerant of the possibility that state courts might 
decide foreign relations cases and/or construe the law of nations after 
their own lights.  As I have suggested elsewhere,25 the Framers guarded 
against the possibility of state court abuse by allowing Congress to 
federalize the law of nations under the “define and punish” clause, but 
Congress has utilized that power only in isolated areas.26  The overall 
structure of concurrent jurisdictional grants to federal and state courts 
and a legislative power grant to Congress does not bespeak any strong 
desire to categorically exclude the states from dealing with international 
law or to confer on federal judges a freestanding power to federalize that 
law. 
II. HISTORY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
How much does (should) all this history matter, anyway?  Professors 
Bellia and Clark’s treatment is largely backward-looking.  They seek to 
inform current debates, but they do not appear to argue that the history 
mandates particular outcomes.  This Part argues that their restraint is 
well-founded.  Three sets of historical changes have overtaken any 
Founding-era case for a federal judicial power to incorporate aspects of 
the law of nations into domestic law, without action by the national 
political branches.27  These changes concern the situation of the United 
States as an actor on the international stage, the character of 
international law itself, and the nature and limits of the national 
lawmaking process. 
As Professors Bellia and Clark note, the young American Republic 
of the Founding Era confronted a hostile world from a position of 
profound weakness.  This prompted, by necessity, a particular attitude 
 
24. Bellia & Clark, supra note 1, at 44.  
25. See Young, Sorting, supra note 5, at 426. 
26. See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)); An Act to Protect the Commerce of the 
United States, and Punish the Crime of Piracy, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 510 (1819) (continued in 
force by Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, 3 Stat. 600) (“That if any person or persons 
whatsoever, shall on the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined, by the law of 
nations . . . such person shall . . . be punished with death.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1651 
(2006) (“Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of 
nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned 
for life.”). 
27. Professors Bellia and Clark do not appear to advance an “originalist” case for 
federal common lawmaking authority in foreign relations in any strong sense of that term.  
They do not, after all, argue that the original public meaning of any term in the 
constitutional text compels recognition of such a power.  Rather, their claim seems to be 
that judicial practice shortly after the Founding recognized this power, and that the power 
is not inconsistent with the constitutional structure as originally understood.  Bellia & 
Clark, supra note 1, at 46–47.  I have a great deal of sympathy for that sort of argument, 
but it is vulnerable to counterarguments that subsequent developments call the functional 
case for such a power into question. 
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toward international law:  The nation could ill afford actions by private 
actors or state governments that might give offense to foreign nations, 
and the need to respond quickly to such crises may have justified a 
freestanding lawmaking power in the federal courts.28  Today the United 
States enjoys peaceful and frequently cordial relations with most nations, 
participates in a number of powerful alliances, and has a historically 
unprecedented military advantage over potential adversaries.29  This 
seismic shift has implications both for the consequences of violations of 
the law of nations by domestic actors and for the relationship between 
the United States and international law.30  On the one hand, particular 
breaches of international law by an individual citizen or a state 
government are unlikely to lead to war; other nations are unlikely to pick 
a fight with the sole military superpower.  On the other, scholars have 
suggested that weak nations tend to rely on international law to enhance 
their security to a greater degree than strong nations,31 and a 
superpower with worldwide interests and responsibilities may wish to 
maximize its freedom of action rather than accede to international 
constraints.32 
The way in which the nation, its subunits, and its citizens interact 
with the rest of the world has also changed profoundly.  The points of 
contact between foreign actors and Americans—not only American 
citizens, but also state and local actors—have proliferated to the extent 
that it is simply unrealistic to expect federal courts to “control” such 
interactions.33  For example, a vast range of state governmental 
activities—from highway safety regulation to administration of the death 
penalty to treatment of immigrants—may implicate foreign relations 
and/or violate international law.34  As Sarah Cleveland has 
 
28. See, e.g., 1 Bradford Perkins, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776–1865, 
in The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations 54–59 (Warren I. Cohen ed., 
1993) (separately paginated work).  
29. See Letter from President George W. Bush (Mar. 16, 2006), in National Security 
Strategy of the United States, at i–ii (2006). 
30. See generally Thomas H. Lee, The Relevance of America’s Status in the World in 
Interpreting the Constitution 4–5 (Feb. 4, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (applying international relations theory to derive original 
meaning of Article III and “the entire ‘foreign affairs Constitution’”).  
31. See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power:  America and Europe in the New 
World Order 8–11 (2003) (discussing U.S. tilt towards unilateralism). 
32. See, e.g., Gennady M. Danilenko, The Statute of the International Criminal 
Court and Third States, 21 Mich. J. Int’l L. 445, 446 (2000) (noting U.S. reluctance to join 
ICC); Douglas E. Edlin, The Anxiety of Sovereignty:  Britain, the United States and the 
International Criminal Court, 29 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2006) (same). 
33. See Jong S. Jun & Deil S. Wright, Globalization and Decentralization:  An 
Overview, in Globalization and Decentralization:  Institutional Contexts, Policy Issues, and 
Intergovernmental Relations in Japan and the United States 1, 3–4 (Jong S. Jun & Deil S. 
Wright eds., 1996) (noting more local participation in “international activities”); see also 
Earl H. Fry, The U.S. States and Foreign Economic Policy:  Federalism in the “New World 
Order,” in Foreign Relations and Federal States 122, 125 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993) 
(observing that “imperatives of complex global interdependence are pushing the non-
central governments to be active participants at the international level”). 
34. See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign 
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demonstrated, it is no longer realistic to expect the nation to “speak with 
one voice” in foreign affairs.35  The foreign affairs power that Professors 
Bellia and Clark would reserve to federal courts thus seems completely 
inadequate to the task of ensuring that neither citizens nor state or local 
governments will disrupt United States foreign policy.  And, in fact, this 
kind of federal judicial intervention has been highly sporadic.36 
A second set of changes concerns the character of the law of nations 
itself.  That law once primarily governed the relations of states to one 
another, but it now also concerns the relations of states to their own 
citizens,37 as well as a host of commercial, environmental, and other 
matters.38  These concerns extend well beyond the traditional matters of 
war and peace upon which Professors Bellia and Clark focus, and it is far 
from clear that the judicial power that Bellia and Clark recognize to 
incorporate the law of nations ought to extend to the far broader 
modern sweep of international law.  As Bellia and Clark probably 
recognize, judicial application of this modern international law often will 
not protect political branch prerogatives, and it may in fact undermine 
those prerogatives.  Moreover, the modern law of nations is formed in 
quite different ways than the international law known to the Framers.  
This is true not only of CIL, which is now more a creature of world 
opinion than a reflection of nations’ actual practice,39 but also of 
multilateral treatymaking and international norms promulgated by 
supranational institutions exercising delegated lawmaking power. 
Parallel changes have affected the enforcement of international law.  
Breaches of the modern law of nations may be addressed not simply by 
the aggrieved nation, but by a variety of multilateral institutions, and the 
range of possible punishments includes trade sanctions and a variety of 
other measures short of war.  Whatever the felt necessity for federal 
 
Affairs Exception, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 139, 180–81 (2001) (describing “areas of 
legitimate (even if not exclusive) state activity [that] have all the attributes that are usually 
cited in arguing for federal exclusivity”). 
35. Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 
46 Vill. L. Rev. 975, 975–76 (2001). 
36. The Court suggested in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 436–41 (1968), that it 
might attempt to police state activities that interfered with U.S. foreign relations.  But 
since then the Court has not squarely applied Zschernig to invalidate state or local action. 
37. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Lecture, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, 
Revisited, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1630, 1649–50 (1999) (discussing aspects of reciprocal 
treaties); Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy, Accountability, 
Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1555, 1556–57 
(1999) (arguing post-World War II international law “subordinates the role of the 
sovereign state”).  
38. E.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.  
39. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 Va. J. Int’l 
L. 449, 454 (2000) (arguing that CIL norms are “unrelated to actual practice perceived as 
legally obligatory”); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:  
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 Austl. Y.B. Int’l L. 82, 83 (1988) 
(describing difficulties of integrating CIL and human rights law). 
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judicial incorporation of the law of nations when few alternative 
enforcement mechanisms existed to avoid the use of military force by 
some other nation, under current circumstances such unilateral judicial 
action is both less pressing and more likely to complicate the working 
out of international disputes through other political and legal 
mechanisms. 
Finally, the United States’s internal lawmaking processes have 
undergone changes just as sweeping as those affecting the international 
arena; both the federal legislature and federal agencies have much more 
power to fashion federal law in this area.  The common law’s 
preeminence has given way to an age of statute.40  The enumerated limits 
on national power have largely given way to an elastic Commerce Clause 
with precious few limits that courts are willing to enforce.41  The 
resulting explosion of national lawmaking has fundamentally altered the 
balance between the nation and the states.42 
As Professor Clark has brilliantly demonstrated, the political and 
procedural limitations on national legislation—embodied in Article I’s 
prescription of a difficult lawmaking process in which states are 
represented—take on particular importance with the expansion of 
federal legislation.43  The importance of such safeguards was reflected in 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.44 Erie insisted that these political and 
procedural limitations inherent in the national lawmaking process 
generally cannot be evaded through judicial lawmaking.45 
Notwithstanding Erie’s insistence that courts not make federal law, 
the demise of the delegation doctrine has allowed federal administrative 
agencies to make federal law without overcoming the procedural hurdles 
in Article I.46  Federal law is thus not only broader in potential scope but 
also easier to produce than in the Founders’ day. 
 
40. See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 1 (1982). 
41. E.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (holding Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority includes power to prohibit cultivation of marijuana under California 
law); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942) (finding regulation of home-consumed 
wheat to be within Congress’s Commerce Clause power).  See generally Ernest A. Young, 
Making Federalism Doctrine:  Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating 
Adjustments, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1733, 1783–90 (2005) (describing “concession[s] to 
the integrated national market” constitutional doctrine has made in Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence). 
42. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart and 
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 495 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
Hart & Wechsler] (observing that, contrary to the situation a half century ago, “at present 
federal law appears to be more primary than interstitial in numerous areas”). 
43. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1321, 1328 (2001). 
44. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  On the significance of Erie to federalism, see generally Ernest 
A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1639, 1655–65 
(2008) [hereinafter Young, Preemption] (describing Erie as “the most important 
federalism case of the twentieth century”). 
45. See Young, Preemption, supra note 44, at 1656–57. 
46. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 476 (2001) (rejecting 
proposal to revive nondelegation doctrine).  
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Under these circumstances, the independent role that Professors 
Bellia and Clark seem to reserve to federal courts seems both 
unnecessary and threatening.  It is unnecessary because the national 
government enjoys ample means to protect its foreign relations 
prerogatives without unilateral judicial action.  Congress has broad 
powers to legislate directly or to delegate authority to the President and 
the executive agencies; hence, if it wishes, Congress can empower federal 
actors to respond nimbly to foreign policy crises without depending on 
the courts to act on their own.  Because so few other limits on national 
power remain, the insistence that Congress in fact act—either directly or 
by express delegation of authority—takes on particular importance.  It is 
one thing for federal courts to make law on occasion within a milieu 
where federal power is otherwise limited; it is quite another to add 
unilateral federal judicial lawmaking authority on top of a largely 
unlimited national legislative power. 
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND TRADITIONAL FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
At the end of the day, it is far from clear what work the law of 
nations actually does in Professors Bellia and Clark’s conception of 
foreign relations law.  They appear to argue that federal courts must 
have some authority to apply the law of nations with the force of federal 
law, without action by the political branches, where such application is 
necessary to protect political branch prerogatives in foreign affairs—and 
particularly with respect to matters of war and peace.47  In such 
situations, however, it seems likely that federal courts would find power 
to act with or without the law of nations, deriving that authority directly 
from the constitutional separation of powers.  Such instances are likely 
to be few and far between, however.  Congress has regulated the exercise 
of foreign affairs powers largely by statute, and in the absence of such 
advance provision, the Supreme Court has lately been unwilling to take 
unilateral action even in the face of significant foreign policy 
consequences. 
In Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Court made clear that its 
power to fashion federal common law rules to protect the foreign 
relations prerogatives of the political branches did not depend upon the 
law of nations.48  Sabbatino recognized the act of state doctrine, which 
“precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of 
the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within 
its own territory,” as a principle of federal common law.49  The Court 
recognized that the act of state doctrine was not part of the law of 
nations;50 rather, 
It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of 
 
47. Bellia & Clark, supra note 1, at 39.   
48. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
49. Id. at 401. 
50. See id. at 421–22.  
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government in a system of separation of powers. . . . The 
doctrine . . . expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch 
that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of 
foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this 
country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community 
of nations as a whole in the international sphere.51 
As such, the doctrine had “‘constitutional’ underpinnings.”52  The act of 
state doctrine thus reflects precisely the imperatives highlighted by 
Professors Bellia and Clark.  Sabbatino underscores the fact, however, that 
where such imperatives to protect the foreign affairs prerogatives of the 
political branches are present, federal courts may act with or without the 
sanction of the law of nations.53 
Such acts of judicial unilateralism seem progressively unnecessary, 
however, in a foreign affairs field that is increasingly governed by 
statutes.  Any number of framework statutes and other enactments 
increasingly act to protect political branch prerogatives and to empower 
the President to act expeditiously in order to avoid crises.54  Recognizing 
this, the Supreme Court has been more and more unwilling to sanction 
unilateral judicial action to incorporate international law into the 
domestic legal system.  In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, for example, the Court 
narrowly construed the Alien Tort Statute to permit only an extremely 
limited range of customary international law claims.55  And in Medellín v. 
Texas, the Court refused to enforce a judgment of the International 
Court of Justice in the absence of federal legislation giving effect to such 
judgments.56  Indeed, the Medellín Court went so far as to invalidate a 
presidential directive seeking to enforce the judgment in the absence of 
 
51. Id. at 423. 
52. Id. 
53. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal 
Common Law, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 513, 534 (2002) (defending federal common lawmaking 
power in foreign affairs cases on Sabbatino model).  Professors Bellia and Clark appear to 
deny that Sabbatino’s act of state doctrine is a creature of federal common law at all.  See 
Bellia & Clark, supra note 1, at 84 (arguing that “the decision is best understood overall as 
a consequence of the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs powers to the political 
branches of the federal government”); see also Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole 
Executive Agreements, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1573, 1651–52 (2007) (attributing act of state 
doctrine to President’s power to recognize foreign governments).  But there has never 
been a bright line between interpretation of open-ended structural provisions and federal 
common lawmaking.  See, e.g., Martha Field, Sources of Law:  The Scope of Federal 
Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 881, 890 (1986) (defining federal common law to include 
“any rule of federal law created by a court . . . when the substance of that rule is not clearly 
suggested by federal enactments—constitutional or congressional” (emphasis omitted)).  
Most observers have classified Sabbatino as a federal common law case.  See, e.g., Tex. 
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citing Sabbatino as federal 
common law case); Hart & Wechsler, supra note 42, at 743 (placing Sabbatino in chapter 
on federal common law). 
54. See Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution:  Sharing Power 
After the Iran-Contra Affair 69–70 (1990) (discussing framework statutes in foreign 
relations law). 
55. 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). 
56. 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1372 (2008). 
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congressional authorization.57  While the Supreme Court may 
occasionally remain willing to apply CIL on a common law basis to fill in 
gaps in various foreign affairs statutes,58 such actions are likely to take a 
back seat to political branch action for the foreseeable future. 
CONCLUSION 
The historical account offered by Professors Bellia and Clark 
provides valuable background to contemporary debates over customary 
international law.  This response has focused on their suggestion, based 
on this history, that there remains some room for federal courts to 
fashion supreme federal rules of decision based on the law of nations.  
Bellia and Clark do not appear to believe that the scope of such judicial 
lawmaking is broad, and to that extent our disagreement is a narrow 
one. 
All too often, courts perceive a gap in the constitutional text as 
requiring unilateral judicial action to fill the lacuna.  Especially in the 
modern era, however, Congress and the President have proven more 
than capable of protecting the nation’s foreign policy interests, either 
through direct legislation or delegated authority, without the need for 
judicial lawmaking.  And where such lawmaking remains necessary, the 
imperative and authority for it comes from the Constitution, as in 
Sabbatino—not from the law of nations.  Whatever historical case can be 
made for unilateral judicial power in the Founding Era, then, seems 
largely overtaken by contemporary developments. 
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